Here are “issue nuggets” you can pre-write and drop into future amicus briefs, drawn from the Eleventh Circuit’s Doe v. Red Roof/Choice/Wyndham/Microtel consolidated opinion:
- Four-part §1595(a) test (plain meaning). A beneficiary claim requires: (1) knowingly benefited; (2) from taking part in a common undertaking/enterprise involving risk and potential profit; (3) that enterprise violated the TVPRA as to the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of that violation. Use this to structure briefs and jury instructions sections.
- Civil vs. criminal standards kept distinct. Courts should not import §1591(e)(4)’s “participation” definition into §1595(a). Helpful where defendants argue for the higher criminal scienter in civil cases.
- “Participation in a venture” ≠ mere observation. Allegations that franchisors sent inspectors, saw reviews mentioning prostitution, or benefited from room revenue were held insufficient to show participation in a trafficking venture; observing is not the same as participating.
- Pleading the “venture” correctly. Plaintiffs framed the venture as a sex-trafficking venture with traffickers and hotel staff; the court faulted the lack of factual tie showing franchisors took part in that venture. Takeaway: define the venture precisely and link the defendant’s actions to that specific enterprise.
- Constructive knowledge survives—but needs linkage. The court recognized §1595’s “knew or should have known,” yet required plausible facts that the defendant knew/should have known this venture violated the TVPRA as to this plaintiff. Draft briefs to show that link.
- Revenue sharing alone is not enough. Franchise royalties tied to room revenue, even if rooms were used for trafficking, did not by itself establish participation in the trafficking venture. Amici can argue what additional facts convert profit-taking into venture participation.
- Franchisor vs. operator liability. The opinion stresses deficiencies as to franchisors that don’t operate/manage the hotel; it leaves room for stronger claims against owners/operators/managers. Use this to explain why standards differ across corporate layers.
- Agency/vicarious liability—day-to-day control matters. For negligence, threadbare assertions that franchisors “controlled operations” failed; courts look for retained operational control. Amici can catalog concrete control factors and manuals/policies that cross the line.
- Ratification needs full knowledge. Keeping benefits isn’t ratification unless the principal had full knowledge of material facts. Use as a checklist for what evidence shows “full knowledge.”
- Georgia RICO predicate acts pleading. Bare recitals (pimping, pandering, sexual servitude) were insufficient. Helpful exemplar of Twombly/Iqbal specificity for state-law racketeering theories.
- Appellate housekeeping (Rule 54(b)). The case is also a clean example of partial final judgment and why consolidated appeals can promote efficiency—useful if you’re supporting interlocutory/Rule 54(b) pathways.
- Concurrence signal. The concurrence underscores that §1595 “participation” doesn’t require participating in the act of trafficking itself and notes that claims against operators/managers may survive—helpful citation for a broader, civil-standard reading.
These bite-size topics can anchor modular paragraphs in your briefs: (1) Elements & Standards (civil vs. criminal; constructive knowledge), (2) Participation & Venture Definition, (3) Corporate Structure & Control, (4) Negligence/Agency/Ratification, (5) Pleading Specificity.
doe v red roof
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/20-11764/20-11764-2021-12-22.html